Attention, working memory, and phenomenal experience of WM content: memory levels determined by different types of top-down modulation by Jane Jacob et al.
PERSPECTIVE
published: 19 October 2015
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01603
Edited by:
Morten Overgaard,
Aarhus University, Denmark
Reviewed by:
Niko Busch,
Charité - Universitätsmedizin Berlin,
Germany
Johan Eriksson,
Umeå University, Sweden
*Correspondence:
Juha Silvanto
j.silvanto@westminster.ac.uk
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Consciousness Research,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 21 May 2015
Accepted: 05 October 2015
Published: 19 October 2015
Citation:
Jacob J, Jacobs C and Silvanto J
(2015) Attention, working memory,
and phenomenal experience of WM
content: memory levels determined
by different types of top-down
modulation.
Front. Psychol. 6:1603.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01603
Attention, working memory, and
phenomenal experience of WM
content: memory levels determined
by different types of top-down
modulation
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What is the role of top-down attentional modulation in consciously accessing working
memory (WM) content? In influential WM models, information can exist in different states,
determined by allocation of attention; placing the original memory representation in the
center of focused attention gives rise to conscious access. Here we discuss various
lines of evidence indicating that such attentional modulation is not sufficient for memory
content to be phenomenally experienced. We propose that, in addition to attentional
modulation of the memory representation, another type of top-down modulation is
required: suppression of all incoming visual information, via inhibition of early visual
cortex. In this view, there are three distinct memory levels, as a function of the top-
down control associated with them: (1) Nonattended, nonconscious associated with no
attentional modulation; (2) attended, phenomenally nonconscious memory, associated
with attentional enhancement of the actual memory trace; (3) attended, phenomenally
conscious memory content, associated with enhancement of the memory trace and
top-down suppression of all incoming visual input.
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INTRODUCTION
In influential models of working memory (WM), information can exist in different states which are
determined by the allocation of attention. The influential model of Cowan (1988) conceptualizes
WM as activated long-termmemory, able to retain a number of activated representations in parallel,
including re-enacted representations from long-term memory. In a development of this model,
Oberauer (2002) introduced a store of reactivated long-term memory representations, a capacity-
limited short-term store (or zone of direct access), and a process of focused attention with amaximal
storage capacity of a single item only (Oberauer, 2002, 2009). However, only representations in
the focus of attention (FOA) can be directly accessed for goal-directed processing (Cowan, 1988).
At the neural level, these attentional effects appear to be manifested as top-down modulations of
neural representations in the sensory cortex which are involved in the maintenance of a given
stimulus. For example, in a study on visual WM, Lewis-Peacock and Postle (2012) found increased
decoding accuracies for attended versus unattendedmemory items in the visual cortex; furthermore,
the unattended WM content could not be decoded from the BOLD signal, indicating that the
attended and nonattended memory items are in different representational states in the visual cortex.
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FIGURE 1 | Depiction of the different possible stages of phenomenal experience in WM tasks for (i) WM maintenance paradigm and (ii) WM
manipulation paradigm. Note that when the task requires interaction with the WM content, the item becomes phenomenally conscious. On the other hand, in the
maintenance task, the participant is phenomenally conscious of the WM content when making a discrimination judgment at the end. *Some participants may use
imagery to perform the task, thus it may involve phenomenally conscious WM content. In other words, when they are not instructed to use imagery, we cannot be
certain that they do not engage in it.
The neural signature of the FOA appears to be fronto-parietal
modulation of the neural representations in sensory regions
engaged in memory maintenance (Feredoes et al., 2011; Riggall
and Postle, 2012; Emrich et al., 2013).
While the state-based models have been effective in explaining
the role of attention in accessing WM content, they have
not addressed the issue of how this information is brought
to phenomenal experience (see Jacobs and Silvanto, 2015, for
review). Yet a key aspect of WM is that its content can be
experienced in the form of an image containing qualia, which
can be consciously scrutinized and manipulated; for example,
modifying WM content on the basis of explicit instructions
requires such a conscious process (see Figure 1). We stress that
we do not refer to the conscious experience of the memory cue,
but rather the process of bringing information from outside of
FOA to phenomenal experience in order to be inspected and
manipulated.
Here we propose that attentional modulation of the actual
memory trace is not by itself sufficient for the memory content
to be phenomenally experienced. We identify three distinct
memory levels, classified by the top-down control associated with
them: (1) nonattended nonconscious memory, associated with
no attentional modulation; (2) attended nonconscious memory,
associated with attentional modulation of the actual memory
representation; (3) attended, phenomenally conscious memory
content, which (in addition to attentional enhancement of the
actual memory trace) involves top-down suppression of all
incoming visual input. Our view differs from prior models in that
there are distinct nonconscious and conscious attended memory
states.
EVIDENCE INDICATING DISSOCIATION
BETWEEN ATTENTION AND
PHENOMENAL EXPERIENCE
OF MEMORY CONTENT
Nonconscious Items Can be Attended
A key finding pointing toward a dissociation between attention
and consciousness in the context of WM is that, in the absence of
awareness, items can be attended, encoded into and maintained
in WM. In a study by Soto et al. (2011), participants were able
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to encode and maintain masked gratings in memory and use
these to perform at above-chance level in a delayed forced-
choice discrimination task, despite reporting being unaware of cue
presence. Above-chance discrimination performance was found
even when distracters were presented during the maintenance
period; this resistance to distracter influence indicates that
attention was allocated to memory content (i.e., it was in the focus
of attention) throughout the delay period.
One might raise the question of whether it can be assumed
that items in WM are attended simply because there is only
one item to keep track of. What speaks in support of the view
that the items held nonconsciously in WM are in fact attended
is that the above-chance discrimination performance found
even when distracters were presented during the maintenance
period. This resistance to distracter influence indicates that
attention was allocated to memory content (i.e., it was in
the FOA) throughout the delay period. Feredoes et al. (2011)
demonstrated that the survival of a WM trace in the presence
of distracters is accomplished by top-down facilitation of visual
cortical regions maintaining the WM content. It is therefore
parsimonious to argue that nonconscious WM content benefits
from this kind of top-down modulation. Studies explicitly
manipulating attention, as used in the study of visual perception
(e.g., Kanai et al., 2006) are required to demonstrate this issue
conclusively.
There are various other examples of nonconsciousWM effects.
Using continuous flash suppression, Pan et al. (2014) showed that
participants were able to make discrimination judgments based
on WM representations of unseen stimuli during interocular
suppression. Bergström and Eriksson (2014) used a rapid serial
visual sequence (from the attentional blink phenomenon) to
render letters as nonconscious, and demonstrated above chance
performance in WM maintenance of the letters of which
participants reported as being unaware. These behavioral findings
are further supported by fMRI studies which have found BOLD
signal changes in right mid-lateral PFC, OFC, and cerebellum
associated with maintaining nonconscious WM representations
(Bergström and Eriksson, 2014). Dutta et al. (2014) report
activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), anterior
PFC (aPFC) and posterior parietal regions when maintaining
nonconscious information in visual WM (Dutta et al., 2014).
Thus prefrontal regions normally associated with attentional top-
down control were engaged in maintenance of nonconscious
items (see Soto and Silvanto, 2014, for review). Furthermore, there
is also evidence for dissociation between attended and conscious
states, where subliminal shapes in visual WM guide attention
and facilitate WM performance (Astle et al., 2010). Based on
these studies, it is evident that WM can maintain nonconscious
representations, i.e., information in the FOA in WM is not
necessarily conscious.
The major implication of these studies is that attention can
be allocated to WM without conscious experience of memory
content, pointing toward a dissociation between conscious access
and attentive memory states. While we do not challenge the
view that attention is required for memory contents to be
phenomenally experienced, we suggest that additional processes
are required for this to occur.
Qualitative Differences Between Conscious
vs. Nonconscious Memory Content
A further reason to suspect a dissociation between attended and
conscious memory states/representations is that once memory
content is brought to phenomenal awareness in the form of
a conscious mental image, it interacts very differently with
external input than memory content of which participants are
not phenomenally aware, even though both are likely to be
attended. Conscious experience of memory content in the form
of mental imagery has been shown to interfere with the encoding
of concurrently presented visual information. When participants
are asked to form a conscious mental image of a recently
presented item (thus phenomenal experience reflecting WM
content), detection threshold of a concurrently present external
visual target is elevated (Craver-Lemley and Reeves, 1987). Such
effects are found regardless of the similarity between the mental
image and visual input and are thought to be functionally
important because it protects the mental image from being
weakened by external information (Craver-Lemley and Reeves,
1992). This inhibition occurs also in the opposite direction,
with external input impairing conscious experience of memory
content, even when the two are identical (Bona et al., 2013).
In short, phenomenally experienced WM content and externally
presented visual information are in an inhibitory relationship,
regardless of any congruency or similarity between the items.
The interaction with external input is fundamentally different
for memory items which are presumably attended but not
required to be phenomenally experienced (i.e., when there is
no need to create a phenomenal mental image). Specifically,
encoding of external stimuli matching WM content is enhanced,
whereas those incongruent withWM content are suppressed (e.g.,
Downing, 2000; Soto et al., 2005; Pan and Soto, 2010; Carlisle and
Woodman, 2011; Gayet et al., 2013). Moreover, when incoming
visual information matches the content of WM, the former will
reach visual awarenessmore effectively; in contrast, non-matching
visual input is suppressed (Pan et al., 2014).
In summary, conscious experience of memory content in the
form of visual imagery suppresses further processing of any visual
input, whereas in the absence of imagery, WM can enhance
the encoding of congruent visual input. It is parsimonious to
assume that the memory item was attended in these studies,
as there was always only one item to be held in memory
and the task instruction stressed the importance of successful
maintenance, and the memory items survive distracter presence.
Yet the interaction between external input and internal attentional
processing varied depending on whether the task required
phenomenal experience of the WM item (i.e., the creation of a
conscious mental image; see Figure 1). This suggests that there
are different types of attended states (phenomenally conscious and
nonconscious), with different functional characteristics.
It might be argued that these differential effects on concurrent
sensory processing can be explained simply in terms of “more” vs.
“less” attention available to WM items. In this view, engaging in
imagerymay require additional attentional resources, which could
otherwise be allocated to the encoding of sensory input. This view
fails to explain the findings discussed above which point toward
a qualitative shift when imagery is engaged. Specifically, when the
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WM item is not imagined, there is a congruency effect such that
input matching WM content is facilitated and incongruent items
are suppressed. Imagery does not modulate this congruency effect
in a quantitative manner but rather abolishes it altogether, with all
incoming information being suppressed.
THREE LEVELS OF MEMORY:
NONATTENDED NONCONSCIOUS,
ATTENDED NONCONSCIOUS, AND
ATTENDED CONSCIOUS
As discussed above, attention can be allocated toward
nonconscious items, demonstrating that attention by itself
is not sufficient for WM content to be consciously experienced
(as has previously been discussed in relation to conscious
experience of external input; cf. Lamme, 2003). Furthermore,
phenomenally experienced memory content can have different
functional properties compared to attended memory content
that is not conscious; as discussed above, conscious experience
of memory content in the form of visual imagery suppresses all
visual input, whereas in the absence of imagery, WM acts as
“gatekeeper” of visual input. Thus, there appears to be more to
conscious experience of WM content than an “attended state”
(e.g., Cowan, 1988, 1998; Oberauer, 2002; LaRocque et al., 2013).
To account for these phenomena, we propose that there
can be both conscious and nonconscious attended memories,
determined by the type of top-down attentional modulation
that is being allocated (as discussed in the next section).
In this view, there are three levels of memory: nonattended
nonconscious memory, attended nonconscious memory, and
attended, phenomenally conscious memory (see Figure 2).
The first level of memory refers to traditional nonconscious
processing of information that is not attended, and would be
consistent with the activated portion of the long-term memory
in Cowan’s and Oberauer’s models. The second level of memory
involves nonconscious processing of information when attention
is directed to it. In the context of visual perception, there is plenty
of evidence of such effects (see Lamme, 2003, for review). InWM,
items can be attended and nonconscious during the maintenance
period when there is no need for conscious examination of
memory content. They can also be in this state when the item was
subliminal to begin with (cf. Soto et al., 2011). The third level of
memory, which is conscious and attended, is where participants
need to phenomenally experience memory representations (in
other words, to create a conscious mental image) in order to
inspect and to manipulate them.
The present proposal reflects the view that attention and
awareness are distinct concepts which do not need to go hand-
in-hand (Lamme, 2003; Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007; Van Boxtel
et al., 2010). While conscious experience of WM content is
likely to require attention, it does not appear to be sufficient
for it. This notion is in accordance with the global workspace
theory (GWT), which states that information held in the
global workspace is conscious, and selective attention determines
what information reaches consciousness (Baars, 2005). Dehaene
et al. (2006) deviate from the dichotomy of conscious and
nonconscious processing to a tripartite distinction, stating that
information can be subliminal, preconscious or conscious. This
view divides the traditional notion of unconscious processing
into subliminal and preconscious states based on the absence
of bottom-up or top-down attention, respectively. Information
is subliminally processed when there is limited bottom-up
processing due to attenuated stimulus strength, potentially
interacting with top-down attention. This state is an example
of attention not predicating consciousness. On the other hand,
with stronger stimulus strength, but limited or no top-down
attention, information undergoes preconscious processing, a state
in which information has the potential for conscious access, but
is not yet conscious. Conscious processing, according to this
model, involves top-down attention and bottom-up activation
past the sensory threshold. Similarly, state-based WM models
assign conscious properties to the FOA and classify activated LTM
representations as being nonconscious (Cowan, 1999; Oberauer,
2002).
While the GWT is not a model of WM but rather a theory
of how visual input reaches awareness, we nevertheless discuss
it here due to its importance in providing a theoretical division
between attention and consciousness; there is value in attempting
to translate its components to the context of WM. Our proposal
is not a direct transfer of this model to WM, in that in the
GWT, subliminal but attended information processing is short-
lived, whereas we propose that in WM, nonconscious attended
representations may be maintained for longer durations and
survive distracter presence as seen in previous studies (Soto et al.,
2011; Pan et al., 2014; Bergström and Eriksson, 2014; Dutta et al.,
2014). Thus, the proposed “attended but nonconscious” level does
not have an exact match in the GWT.
MEMORY LEVELS DETERMINED BY THE
TYPE(S) OF TOP-DOWN ATTENTIONAL
MODULATION
In various models of WM, attentional modulation of neural
representations encoding the memory content (in other
words, placing the memory item into FOA) enables conscious
experience of that content. We propose that for WM content to
reach phenomenal awareness in the conscious mental image,
additionally another type of top-down modulation is required:
the suppression of incoming visual information by inhibition of
earliest visual processing (see Figure 2).
The need for such suppression arises from the fact that
during conscious perception, it is critical to ascertain the
source of conscious experience, in order to avoid confusion
between internal and external sources of information. Such
confusion can occur if internally generated and externally
induced percepts are not kept apart, as observed in the Perky
effect (i.e., the phenomenon where external input is confused
to be part of mental imagery; Perky, 1910). Therefore, when
WM content needs to be brought to phenomenal awareness,
it is important that external information is not concurrently
consciously experienced. The suppression of any incoming
feedforward input prevents confusion between internally
generated and externally induced perception, by preventing
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Traditional and proposed models of WM: The top row illustrates the bipartite distinction of state-based models between activated representations of
LTM, which are nonconscious, and attended representations in the FOA in WM, which are consciously processed. The bottom row illustrates the proposed three
levels of WM which range from nonconscious representations that are not attended, to those that are attended, and finally, attended and conscious WM
representations. Note that the state-based model does not account for the intermediate attended but nonconscious level of WM. (B) Three levels of WM processing
are proposed—(1) Nonattended, nonconscious: activated representations without top down modulation, (2) Attended but nonconscious: attentional facilitation of
neural representation engaged in maintenance, (3) Attended and conscious: attentional facilitation of neural representation engaged in maintenance plus suppression
of early visual cortex of incoming input. This suppression could happen in early visual cortex or even at lower levels, as attention has been shown to modulate LGN
as well.
the latter from reaching conscious experience (see last panel in
Figure 2B).
Why is this suppression needed? Under normal circumstances,
a strong external stimulus is likely to win the competition for
consciousness, as it induces stronger neural activity than visual
imagery of the very same item (e.g., Kreiman et al., 2000). For this
reason, when WM content needs to be brought to phenomenal
awareness, the competition for consciousness needs to be biased
in its favor. Suppression of incoming external input is thus a strong
contributing factor in conscious experience of WM content.
As discussed in “Evidence Indicating Dissociation Between
Attention and Phenomenal Experience of Memory Content,”
engaging in imagery suppresses the encoding of incoming visual
information (e.g., Craver-Lemley and Reeves, 1987). There is
also neural evidence consistent with this view. In an fMRI study
requiring participants to engage in imagery of visual motion,
Kaas et al. (2010) found that activity in the early visual cortex
was reduced during imagery, whereas it was enhanced in the
motion-selective extrastriate region V5/MT (Kaas et al., 2010).
It is interesting to note that the same early visual areas do
show an increase in BOLD signal when motion information
is held in WM without the need to phenomenally experience
that memory content (Goebel et al., 1998; Slotnick et al.,
2005). This is consistent with the view that the requirement
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to phenomenally experience an internally generated image is
associated with suppression of early visual areas. Given that
this type of suppression is only observed when consciously
experiencing WM content, it is not to be mistaken simply as
distractor inhibition mechanism, since it is not observed during
conventional WM tasks that do not require imagery.
It needs to be noted that, at the behavioral level, distracter
suppression can happen for items which we would argue to be
attended but nonconscious; indeed, a hallmark of WM is that
its content survives the presence of distracters. However, the
key issue here is the neural implementation. As discussed above,
the survival of a WM trace in the presence of distracters is
implemented by strengthening neural activity in regions encoding
the memory target, rather than by suppressing neural activity
associated with distracters (Feredoes et al., 2011). We propose
that indiscriminatory neural suppression of all incoming visual
input at earliest levels of visual processing is a type of top-down
modulation tightly linked to phenomenal experience of WM
content.
Thus, the gist of our proposal is the following: behavioral
suppression of distracters in conventional WM paradigms is
accomplished by neural facilitation of the memory trace. In
imagery, an additional mechanism is involved: neural suppression
of all incoming input at the earliest levels of visual processing.
As shown in Figure 2, this gives rise to the following levels of
memory (whether these exist as separate states or as multiple
representations requires further study):
(1) Nonattended: associated with no attentional modulation
(2) Attended nonconscious memory content: at the neural level,
associated with top-down attentional modulation of the
actual memory representation
(3) Attended, phenomenally conscious memory content: at the
neural level, associated with attentional enhancement of the
actual memory representation AND top-down suppression of
incoming visual input
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The aim of this article has been to clarify the relationship
between top-down attentional control in phenomenal experience
of WM content. Recently, we have argued that phenomenally
experiencing WM involves the creation of a second, distinct,
representation of the memory content (Jacobs and Silvanto,
2015). This raises the question of how the two top-down
processes described above relate to the creation of this “conscious
copy.” Possibly, top-down facilitation of the original memory
trace is the process through which the generation of the
second representation is achieved, while additional suppression
of external visual input is required for this copy to win the
competition for consciousness. Another open empirical question
is the neural basis of the different processes and representations
involved in phenomenal awareness of WM content. This could
be addressed by a multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) study
which manipulates the level of phenomenal conscious access
during a delay period in which distracters are presented. For
example, participants could be shown a display of items, and
later cued to consciously access one of the memory items and
hold it in conscious phenomenal experience throughout the delay.
In another similar condition, participants would be cued to
maintain one of the memory items inWM, but not be required to
phenomenally experience the item during maintenance (similar
to most retro-cue WM discrimination tasks). During the delay,
distracters would be presented. We would predict that, in both
conditions, there would be stronger neural representation in
regions maintaining the WM content. However, only in the
“phenomenal awareness” condition, there would be a suppression
of early visual regions as well as any extrastriate region selective
for the distracter.
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